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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.
HERBERT A. HART and MRS. HERBERT A. HART, hiis wife,

Case No.
12101

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RES'PONDENT
STATEMENT AND KIND OF CASE
This is an action on a Contract for Deed for real estate
located in Salt Lake City. By the terms of the contract,
defendant shall keep all taxes paid. Defendant did not pay
the taxes. Taxes were paid by the plaintiff. The contract
provided the balance could be paid at any time and the contract gave seller option to repurchase. Defendant made a
deal to sell the property and asked plaintiff for a waiver
of option to purchase and for a pay-off figure, which figure
was given to defendant, Mr. Hart from an amortization
table without including the taxes, which taxes had been
paid by the plaintiff. This is a suit to recover the taxes
pa,id by the plaintiff and not included lin the payoff figure.
Defendants' defense i•s accord and satisfaction, and claims
evidence was erroneously admitted.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant for the sum of $1,433.26, the
amount of the taxes paid by the plaintiff, and interest.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests the court to affirm the judgment
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants' Statement of Facts is not complete and
conclusions are made in defendants' Brief which are not
based on the full facts. Therefore, plaintiff makes the following Statement of Facts:
A contract entitled Contract for Deed, (Exhibit 1 P)
was executed August 12, 1963, by the terms of which the
plaintiff agreed to sell to defendants property on 2nd West
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The conveyance was to be made
by a Special Warranty Deed, a copy of which was attached
to the Contract for Deed. Also, there was an Option Agreement attached to the Contract for Deed, by the terms of
which the buyer granted to Phillips Petroleum Company a
first refusal (option to purchase) the property at any time
prior to the conveyance of title of said property to the
buyer.
The defendants were to make monthly payments, the
entire balance of the purchase price to be paid at any time
without penalty and the contract further provided the
shall ente1· into possession and shall keep all taxes
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paid. The defendants went into possession of the property,
made the monthly payments, but failed to pay the taxes.
Tax notices were sent to plaintiff.
In January of 1967 the defendant, Mr. Hart, talked
to Mr. Gordon Wirick, District Real Estate Representative
of PhiUips Petroleum Company, and said he had a chance
to sell the property and asked Mr. Wirick to get a waiver
of Phillips Petroleum Company's first right of refusal to
purchase the property as stipulated in the Contract for
Deed (R. 40-41). Mr. Wirick promised he would write the
home office at Bartlesville, Oklahoma, which he did (R.
51). He received the waiver of the first right of refusal
option agreement. Thereafter, Mr. Wirick had a conversation with Mr. Hart in February in which Mr. Hart told Mr.
that the fiirst deal had fallen through but he had a
chance to •sell the property again and asked if the Phillips
Petroleum Company would waive the first right of refusal
(option agreement) to the second proposed sale. Mr. Wirick
told him that he had the letter in his possession and that
he could come and get it. He gave the letter to Mr. Hart
(R. 52). At about the same time, Mr. Hart asked for the
payoff figure and Mr. Wirick looked at the amortization
schedule and told him that the payoff figure was $3,486.18.
The amortization schedule is attached to Exhibit 7 P. (Mr.
Wirick's letter to Attorney Hatch.)
At a subsequent conversation Mr. Hart called Mr.
Wirick and told him that the sale had gone through and
asked him for the exact payoff figure. At that time Mr.
Wil'ick told Mr. Hart that the payoff figure was $3,501.39
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which was a few dollars more than the figure he had given
him before because the interest was figured to the exact
date. Mr. Hart brought fo a check for $3,501.39. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Wirick delivered the deed to Mr. Hart.
After Mr. Wirick delivered the deed to Mr. Hart, he
realized that he had failed to include the general property
taxes that had been assessed against the property during
the term of the Contract for Deed, which taxes had been
paid by Phillips Petroleum Co. (R. 54 and R. 65 and Exhibits P2, P7 and P8). Mr. Wirick notified the Credit Department that he had failed to include the taxes paid by
Phillips Petroleum Co. on property in the pay-off figure
(R. 54).
Thereafter the Credit Department of PhiHips Petroleum Company sent a letter to Mr. Hart, Exhibit 2 P dated
November 17, 1967 stating:
"We find you have not paid for the property taxes
for the year 1963 through 1966. These taxes were
previously billed to and paid by Phillips Petroleum
Company."
and the letter, Exhibit 2 P contains an itemization of the
taxes by years.
Exhibit 3 P, dated December 7, 1967, a letter from
Phillips Petroleum Company to Defendant, Mr. Hart, again
asking for the taxes.
Exhibit 4 P, dated December 19, 1967, a letter from
Phillips Petroleum Company to Defendant Mr. Hart, written by witness G. C. Wirick, asking for the taxes.

Exhibit 5 P, dated January 3, 1968, a letter from Phillips Petroleum Co. to Defendant Hart, being the second
letter written by witness G. C. Wirick, asking for the taxes.
Exhibit 6 P, dated January 27, 1968, a letter from
Attorney Sumner Hatch to Phillips Petroleum Co. in which
he states no dispute made of the amount, but alleging accord and satisfaction.
That after the letter, Exhibit 6 P, witness Wirick
talked to Mr. Hatch who wanted to know how he arrived
at the figures (R. 57). That in response to this question,
Mr. Wirick wrote Exhibit 7 P Letter setting out pay off
and the amount of the taxes by years and how he arrived
at the pay off.
Exhibit 8 P, dated April 3, 1968, letter written by
Attorney Sumner Hatch in answer to letter from witness
Wirick's letter dated March 25, 1968, Exhibit 7 P, in which
letter Attorney Hatch states:
"We do not disagree with your figures, but we do
disagree with the reasonring. It would seem that
Mr. Hart requested from your company a payoff
figure, and upon receipt of that payoff figure, paid
the matter, and in return received a quit claim deed.
"We are forced to take the stand that there was an
accord and satisfaction on this matter."
That thereafter the Complaint was fiiled in the above en1Jitled case. Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Complaint is as
follows ( R. 1) :
"That the defendants have paid said contract with
the exception of paying the taxes, and the plaintiff
has paid said taxes and the amount of taxes due are
as follows:
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"1963 taxes (pro-rated from September 12,
1963, 142 days at $.93 per day, $340.36, 196:3
- $122.76, 1964 - $381.48, 1965 - $401.88,
1966 - $356.67."
That at no place in defendants' answer is there any
denial of the contents of Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's Complaint. Paragraph 2 of defendants' Answer, (R. 4) Third
Defense, states:
"2. That a novation to the contract was created by
the conversations and requested pay-off figure and
said amount has been fully satisfied."
During the trial of the case, it was admitted that the
taxes for 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966 had not been paid by the
defendant, Mr. Hart.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE ARE FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD OF THE AMOUNT AND PAYMENT
OF THE TAXES BY THE PLAINTIFF.
(1) NO ISSUE RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS
AS TO THE AMOUNT AND PAYMENT OF
TAXES. BOTH COURT AND PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL WERE MISLED BY THE PLEADINGS, ACTS AND CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEY, IF THERE WAS TO BE
AN ISSUE RAISED AS TO THE AMOUNT
AND PAYMENT OF TAXES.
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(2) LETTERS SENT BY PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANTS SETTING OUT THE PAYMENTS
AND AMOUNTS OF TAXES DUE WITH NO
DENIAL, AND ADMISSION IN DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEY'S LETTERS THAT THE
FIGURES ARE CORRECT AND THAT THEY
DO NOT DISAGREE WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S
FIGURES.
(3) ADMISSIONS, TAXES NOT PAID BY
DEFENDANT HART.
(4) ORAL EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE
AND PART OF IT NOT OBJECTED TO.
Defendants state no evidence of amount and payment
of taxes. We submit this is not the fact and we set out the
following facts which are in the record, which support the
points above set out, which have heretofore been mentioned
in our Statement of Facts.
In the Complaint it is set out the amount of the taxes
by years of which there was no denial in the Answer or
any of the other pleadings (R. 1, 4) and no issue made by
the pleadings of the payment or the amount of the taxes
or in the discussion with the court and counsel.
Testimony of Gordon Wirick and the statements by
the Court are as follows (R. 54) :
"Q. Now, then what was the next thing which
occurred in regard to this tramsaction?

"A. Shortly after I had delivered the deed to Mr.
Hart I realized that I had failed to include the gen-
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eral property taxes that had been assessed against
the property during the term of the contract for
deed, and that had been paid by Phillips Petroleum
Company."
Mr. Hatch objected to the testimony. His objection
was overruled, (R. 54) and thereafter the following occurred:
"THE COURT: I simply make that statement
based on my own review of the file submitted to me
in light of my discussion with counsel. It was my
impression there was no real issue of fact in light
of payment of taxes. The defense is based on novation and perhaps waiver that Mr. Hart spoke about.
That's the real defense in this case.
"MR. HATCH: We haven't paid them as far as
that goes.
"THE COURT: All right, I think that clears it up
anyway. Go ahead ( R. 55) . "
And at R. 65 the following:
"THE COURT: Mr. Wirick, the taxes were defaulted from 1963, '64, and so on, weren't they, by
the buyer - by Hart on this contract, paid by Phillips?
"THE WITNESS: They were paid by Phillips, yes."
Exhibit 2 P is a letter to Mr. Hart which states as
follows:
"SUBJECT: Prior Years' Property Taxes, Service
Station 7241, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
"In reviewing our file on the su!Jjed stat<ion, which
was sold to you on a Contract for Deecl dated Aug-

ust 12, 1963, we find that you have not paid for
the property taxes for the years of 1963 through
1966. These taxes were previously billed to and paid
by Phillips Petroleum Company.
"An itemization of the taxes paid are as follows:
1963 $340.36, 1964 $381.48, 1965 $401.88, 1966
$356.67, total $1,480.39."
Exhibit 3 Pis another letter wl'itten by W.R. Cowdrey
of Phillips Petroleum Company Credit Department to Mr.
Herbert Hart asking for the taxes.
Exhibit 4 P is a letter to Mr. Hart written by witness,
G. C. Wirick asking for the money and Exhibit 5 P is another letter written to Mr. Hart by witness Mr. Wirick
asking for the money. Exhibit 6 P is a letter from Attorney Sumner Hatch in answer to lVIr. Wirick's letter of January, 1968, Exhibit 5 P, which he states:
"If I am not mistaken, the pay-off figure quotation,
the receipt of the money and the return of the deed
constitute an accord and satisfaction to the agreement between your company and Mr. Hart."

No dispute as to the amount or payment of the taxes
mentioned or asserted by Mr. Hatch.
Exhibit 7 P is a letter to Attorney Hatch from G. C.
Wirick reviewing the entire transaction and setting out the
amount of taxes that were paid and Mr. Hart's tax obligation which is the same as set out in the Complaint. The
letter, Exhibit 7 P further t:States:
"In accordance with our telephone conversation of
March 25, 1967 * * * Since the contract for
Deed became effective September 12, 1963, the 1963
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taxes should be pro-rated as follows: 1963 Taxes
$340.36 (p1·0-rated from September 12, 1963 - 132
days at $.93 I day = $122.76. Purchaser's tax obligation: 1963 $122.76, 1964 $380.48, 1965 $401.88,
1966 $356.67, total $1,262.79). Mr. Hart paid the
property taxes due for 1967.
As a matter of information, the above taxes included the tax on real estate and personal property.
Mr. Hart was in possession of the property during
this period of time. * * *
Phillips inadvertently failed to include the taxes
paid on the property on behalf of Mr. Hart for the
above period when the Special Warranty Deed was
issued to him. We are attaching an executed copy
of the Contract for Deed signed by both parties,
whereby the 'Buyer' agrees to pay all taxes on the
property, (see paragraph 3 underlined in red) during the Contract for Deed."
The amortization schedule was attached to the above
letter.
Exhibit 8 Pis a letter by Mr. Hatch in answer to Mr.
Wirick's letter, Exhibit 7, in which he said:
"As you requested, I called Mr. Hart in and went
over the payment schedule you sent me, together
with the rest of the documents in the f ile.
1

We do not disagree with your figures, but we do
diisagree with the reasoning. It would seem that Mr.
Hart requested from your company a payoff figure,
and upon receipt of that payoff figure, paid the
matter, and in return received a quit cla:im deed.
We are forced to take the stand that there was an
accord and satisfaction on this matter."
A certified letter, return receipt, was mailed by Phil-
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lips Petroleum Co. to Mr. Hart, Exhibit 9 P, setting out
that the legal department of Phillips Petroleum Co. did not
think there was an accord and satisfaction and if not paid
it would be placed for collection.
Attorney Hatch admitted the taxes were not paid by
l\ir. Hart (R. 55) and Mr. Hart testifiied he did not pay the
taxes (R. 43).
Mr. Wirick testified nothing was said about taxes at
time payoff figure was given (R. 54). When first examined
as an adverse witness, Mr. Hart testified that the taxes
were not mentioned. He later modified that rin answer to
questions from his attorney, stating that the taxes were not
paid and someone he could not identify said that they would
\Vaive the taxes (R. 41).
Defendant in his brief says Mr. Wirick "has already
testified that he had no personal knowledge as to the payment of the taxes." This is a misstatement. There ii.s nothing in the record of such a statement by Mr. Wirick. Mr.
Wirick testified taxes paid by Phillips Petroleum Co. (R.
54, 65). Mr. Hatch did not cros•s examine nor did he ask
Mr. Wirick how he knew that the Phillips Petroleum Company had paid the taxes. Mr. Wirick did not testify he was
told by anyone. He testified to the fact that the taxes had
been paid and he wrote the letter setting out all of the figures. Exhibit P 7. The statement of Mr. Wi1'1ick was based
upon the knowledge which he had acquired from the records of his company from his conversation with Mr. Hatch,
and Mr. Wirick had the information and wrote the letters
to Mr. Hart and to attorney Hatch.

Mr. Hart could have testified that he had paid the
taxes and it would have been competent evidence. Mr.
Wirick, property manager of thiis division of Phillips
Petroleum Company, testified that Phillips Petroleum Company had paid the taxes, which we submit is competent
evidence.
Even assuming it was not competent evidence, the payment of taxes was never an issue in the instant case.
The letters sent to Mr. Hart and the letters sent to Mr.
Hatch amount to an account stated, the amount wais never
questioned by the defendant, Mr. Hart, nor by his attorney.
Defendant cites cases of John C. Cutler Association v.
De Jay Stores, 279 P. 2nd 700, 3 U. 2d 107. We do not disagree with the rule of law as set out in this case and as set
out in headnote 4, Appeal and Error, which is as follows :
"Where trial court found for defendant, Supreme
Court had to view evidence and every fair inference
and intendment arising therefrom in light most favorable to defendant, and ff and when so regarded,
there was any substantial evidence or any reasonable basis in the evidence to support finding made
by trial court, it would not be disturbed."
We submit that there is ample evidence in the iinstant
case to sustain the Findings of the trial court and there
were admissions and waiver ais to the amount and payment
of taxes. Defendant quotes from the concurring opinion
written by Justice Wade in the Cutler case, supra, which
discusses the question of hearsay evidence. Justice Wade
concluded that the evidence in the Cutler case, supra, was
not hears:iy, but concur.s in the result of the main opinion
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on the grounds that there was no proper foundation. We
contend that the oral evidence in this case was not hearsay,
it w:c.s not objected to as being hearsay, and the discussion
does not deal with facts similar to the instant case. The
oral testimony that the taxes were paid is primary evidence
and is not hearsay.
Defendant cites the case of Lake Shore Motor Coach
Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P. 2d 1011, 9 U. 2nd 114. This
case involves the Public Service Commission granting a
permit for a motor carrier. We do not disagree with the
rule of law that the Public Service Commission cannot make
findings of facts unless there is .gome competent evidence
to support them. Our contention is that in the present case
there was competent evidence to support the court's findings and also there was a waiver requiring any evidence
both by the statements of defendant's counsel and the defendant and the def endant'.g counsel's pleadings and the
course of deaHngs perta:ining to the payment of the taxes.
Defendant cites the case of Ephraim Willow Creek Irr.
Co. v. Olson, 70 U. 95, 258 Pac. 216. This particular part of
the case deals with the statement of an alleged agent made
out of court as being inadmissible to prove his agency. We
do not disagree with the statement of the law as to agency.
We submit it has no bearing in the in.gtant case.
Defendant cites the case of Stevens V. Mostachetti, 167
P. 2nd 809 Cal. This is a California case. We submit that
this case is not in point. That it is distinguishable on the
facts. We submit that there is in the record evidence to
·3c1stain the findings, oral testimony, admissions, and issues

14

were not raised by the pleadings as to the amount and payment of taxes.
There is nothing in the evidence which says that anyone told Mr. Wirick the amount of the taxes and he was
not examined on how he knew that the taxes had been paid.
The court overruled defendants' objection to the evidence
and the defendants did not attempt nor did he bring out
as to how Mr. Wirick knew that the taxes had been paid.
Plaintiff objects that there is no evidence as to the
amount or payment of the taxes. We submit that the lettern
in this case are competent and relevant evidence of the
amount claimed by plaintiff and was admitted that the
figures were correct by Attorney Hatch's letter.
It is admitted that the taxes were not paid by Mr. Hart

and we all know that the property would have been sold at
the May sale if the taxes had not been paid by the time
defendant was asked to pay the taxes.
We have pointed out above that there was (1) no issue
raised by the pleadings as to the amount and payment of
taxes. Both court and plaintiff's counsel were misled by
the pleadings, acts and conduct of defendants' attorney, if
there was to be an issue raised as to the amount and payment of taxes; (2) Letters sent by plaintiff to defendant
setting out the payments and amount of taxes due with no
denial, and admission in defendants' attorney's letters that
the figures are correct and that they do not disagree with
the plaintiff's figures; (3) Admissions, taxes not paid by
defendant Hart; ( 4) Oral evidence was admissible and part
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of it not objected to, the taxes had been paid by Phillips
Petroleum Company.
POINT II.
NO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
TO HAVE AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION,
THERE MUST BE AN AGREEMENT AND
CONSIDERATION AND THERE WAS NO
AGREEMENT AND NO CONSIDERATION.
Under the terms of the contract, the defendant could
pay off the contract at any time and if he so elected, which
he did in this case, the Phillips Petroleum Company was
bound to give him the deed for the amount of money then
due on the contract, which wa.g done. Mr. Hart elected to
have the contract paid off and asked for a pay-off figure
which was given to him, and further requested that Phillips
Petroleum waive their first right of refusal (option). The
amount he paid was the exact amount as due under the
contract less taxes. When Mr. Hart requested the deed,
Phillips Petroleum Company was bound under the terms
of the contract to give it to him. There was no payment of
the contract before maturity and, therefore, the law pertaining to payment before maturity does not apply to the
facts in this ca.ge, but the law is as set out in the Utah cases
hereinafter cited.
Mr. Wirick testified that he talked to Mr. Hart and
gave him the pay-off figure. That he did not talk about the
taxes when the pay-off figure was given and when he discovered he hadn't collected the taxes, he sent a letter to the
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credit department, who wrote to Mr. Hart. Mr. Hart first
stated that nothing further was said about taxes and then
in answer to his attorney's questions he said that he didn't
remember who he talked to, but it was someone at Phillips
Petroleum Company and he asked him if he had paid the
taxes. He said no and then he said that they would waive
it. Mr. Hart would have had to talk to someone who had
authority to have made the deal and the person who he had
to talk to would have been Mr. Wirick who said he did not
mention taxes and if Mr. Hart had mentioned the taxes,
they would have been added to the pay off figure and we
would not have this law suit.
To have an accord and satisfaction, there must be a
contract and there must be a consideration. See the hereinafter cited cases.
The Defendant has cited Corpus Juris and American
Juris Prudence, but we submit that these do not apply to
the facts in this case, but that this case is controlled by the
following Utah cases which are directly in point.

Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of the
United States, 72 P. 2d 1060, 94 U. 532, note 5. There
must be consideration for an agreement of accord and satisfaction, page 1068 of the Pacific, list column middle of
column:
"There must be consideration for the agreement.
Settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim
where the parties are apart in good faith presents
such consideration. Where the claim is definite and
no dispute but an admittance of its owing, the agree-
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ment to take a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is not good unless attended by isome consideration. In this case we do not see the elements
of an accord and satisfaction. True, there was a
claim. It was filed and paid in accordance with demand with no dispute. If a doctor sends me a bill
for $20.00 when it should have been $30.00 and I
pay it, it is not an accord and sati..sfaction. It is
merely payment of less than I owe."
The contract between Phillips Petroleum and Mr. Hart
provides the entire balance of the purchase price may be
paid at any time without penalty. Mr. Hart made a request
for the pay-off figure. Under the terms of the contract, he
had a right to request it and he had a right to pay it off
and Phillips Petroleum Co. was bound to convey the property. The contract was not paid before maturity. It was
all due by Mr. Hart requesting the pay-off figure and requesting the Deed.
The case of F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build,
Inc., 40,1 P. 2d 670, 17 U. 2d 80, headnote 5, page 672 of
the Pacific :
"The general rule, and the rule which this court has
followed, is that where a claim is for a definite and
undisputed amount which is past due, an agreement
by the creditor (Cook) to take a lesser amount,
which is paid, does not discharge the whole debt.
This is so because the creditor received only what
he i•s entitled to and there is no consideration for
the new agreement."
Under note 5 in this case they cite the following cruses
and authorities:
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"5. See Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97, 75 P. 2d 669 (1938);
Gray V. Bullen, 50 Utah 270, 167 P. 683 (1917);
Restatement, Contracts, section 417, comment c.
(1932) ."
In the case of F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc.,
they cite the case of Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity
Building & Loan Ass'n, 75 P. 2d 669, 74 Utah 97, and we
quote from page 676 of the Pacific 1st column:
". . . The discharge of claims by way of accord and
satisfaction is dependent upon a contract express
or implied; and it follows that the essentials necessary to valid contracts generally must be present in
a contract of accord and satisfaction. Therefore,
the following elements are essential : ( 1) A proper
subject matter, (2) competent parties, (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties, and
( 4) a consideration."
"[7-9] To the same effect see 1 C. J. S., Accord
and Satisfaction, p. 469, 3 (a). This court in a
number of cases has followed the rule thus enunciated; Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 P. 412,
Ann. Cas. 1915C, 113; Rohwer v. Burrell, 42 Utah
510, 134 P. 573; Gray v. Bullen, 50 Utah 270, 167
P. 683; Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P. 2d 1073;
Sullivan v. Beneffrial Life Ins. Co., Utah, 64 P. 2d
351; Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
U. S., Utah, 72 P. 2d 1060, 1068. In the case last
cited we said : 'An accord is an agreement between
parties, one to give or perform, the other to receive
or accept, such agreed payment or performance in
satisfaction of a claim. The "satisfaction" is the
consummation of such agreement. There must be
consideration for the agreement. Settlement of an
unliquidated or disputed claim where the parties are
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apart in good faith presents such consideration.
Where the clruim is definite and no dispute but an
admittance of its owing, the agreement to take a
lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is not
good unless attended by some cons.ideration.' "
Also in the Badger case at page 677 of the Pacific, it
states:
"Having pleaded an accord and satisfaction, the
burden was upon the defendant to prove such defense." Citing cases.
Under the Financial Corp. case they also cite the case
of Gray v. Bullen, 50 Utah 270, 167 P. 683, it states on page
684 of the Pacific at bottom and top of page 685 :
"The law is very clearly stated in 1 Cyc. 319, in the
following words :
"Where the debt or demand is liquidated or certain,
and is due, payment by the debtor and receipt by
the creditor of a less sum is not a satisfaction thereof, although the creditor agrees to accept it ais such,
if there be no release under seal or no new consideration given. Payment of a less amount than is
due operates only as a discharge of the amount paid,
leaving the balance still due, and the creditor may
sue therefore, notwithstanding the agreement. A
court of equity has no power to enjoin collection of
the balance.
"In Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 Pac. 412,
Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1113, the headnote correctly reflects the decisdon, and it is there rstated :"
"When it is claimed that payment by the debtor of
a sum less than is due to the creditor is a payment
in full discharge of the entire amount due, a receipt
acknowledging full payment is not controlling; but
it must also appear that the payment was based on
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a sufficient independent consideration or on a compromise of a disputed or unliquidated claim."
In the Smoot v. Checketts case, 41 Utah 211, 125 Pac.
412, at page 413 of the Pacific bottom of second column:
" ... The mere fact that, under such circumstances,
the claimants executed receipts in full when they
had in fact received only about one-third of the
amounts then due them from the contractors for
labor is of slight, if any importance. As to whether
the receipt of a less sum will discharge a greater
one does not depend upon the form of the receipt
that is given."
"[2] When it is claimed that the payment by the
debtor of a sum of money less than is due and owing
to the creditor is a payment in full discharge of the
entire amount due, a receipt acknowledgiing full
payment standing alone is not controlling. If such
a payment is based upon a sufficient independent
consideration, or upon a compromise of a disputed
or an unliquidated claim, and under such circumstances the lesser sum is received ais payment in
discharge of the larger one, the payment is binding
upon the creditor." (Citations omitted.)
"In the foregoing cases, the doctrine of what constitutes a sufficient consideration for the discharge
of a debt then due by the payment of an amount
less than the whole debt is fully illuistrated. Under
the authority of every one of the cases referred to
above, with many others which might be cited, the
payment in the ca:se at bar did not amount to either
a compromise of a disputed claim or an accord and
satisfaction."
The defendant's claim that it is a unilateral mistake
by the plaintiff and as to the information peculiarly within
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its knowledge, is a misstatement of the facts. Mr. Hart
knew about the taxes and this is not the case where the
parties are entering into a new contract, but they had already entered into the contract and it is a question of accord and satisfaction and is governed by the rules of law
above set out.
CONCLUSION
The contract provrl.ded that the defendant was to pay
the taxes. There 1is no reaison why the defendant should not
comply with the terms of the contract.
There was never any issues raised as to the amount
and payment of the taxes by the pleadings, and the exact
:liigures were set out in Mr. Wirick's letter to attorney Hatch
who agreed that the figures were correct and relied solely
on accord and satisfaction.
There 1is no diispute as to the amount due under the
contract. There was no consideration given by the defendant to the plaintiff. Therefore, under the Utah cases,
there is no accord and satisfaction.
We submit that the judgment of the tl1ial court should
be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS
705 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent

